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ABSTRACT  
   
This study investigates the relation between credit supply competition among 
banks and their clients’ conditional accounting conservatism (i.e., asymmetric timely loss 
recognition). The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 
permits banks and bank holding companies to expand their business across state lines, 
introducing a positive shock to credit supply competition in the banking industry. The 
increase in credit supply competition weakens banks’ bargaining power in the negotiation 
process, which in turn may weaken their ability to demand conservative financial 
reporting from borrowers. Consistent with this prediction, results show that firms report 
less conservatively after the IBBEA is passed in their headquartered states. The effect of 
the IBBEA on conditional conservatism is particularly stronger for firms in states with a 
greater increase in competition among banks, firms whose operations are more 
concentrated in their headquarter states, firms with greater financial constraints, and firms 
subject to less external monitoring. Robustness tests confirm that the observed decline in 
conditional conservatism is causally related to the passage of IBBEA. Overall, this study 
highlights the impact of credit supply competition on financial reporting practices.   
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates whether credit supply competition among banks affects 
their clients’ conditional conservatism in financial reporting. Numerous studies document 
that lenders make extensive use of borrowers’ financial reporting information in debt 
contracting to reduce conflicts of interest between lenders and borrowers (Ahmed et al. 
2002; Christensen and Nikolaev 2012; Watts 2003; Zhang 2008). For instance, 
Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) maintain that capital covenants and performance 
covenants that rely on borrowers’ accounting information reduce agency costs and help 
lenders exert their monitoring over borrowers. Among all accounting information 
characteristics, asymmetrically timely recognition of bad news—namely, conditional 
conservatism—is one of the essential characteristics on which lenders focus. Because 
lenders only receive fixed payments when borrowers perform well, and may not get fully 
paid if borrowers go bankrupt, they place a greater emphasis on the lower bounds of 
borrowers’ earnings distributions (Watts 2003). Conservative financial reporting not only 
can mitigate conflicts of interest between debtholders and shareholders over dividend 
policy (Ahmed et al. 2002) but also can trigger debt covenant violations more quickly 
(Zhang 2008), allowing lenders to intervene directly with borrowers and take protective 
actions. Therefore, lenders have a strong demand for borrowers’ conservative financial 
reporting that recognize bad news more quickly than good news. 
Since banks play an important role in shaping borrowers’ financial reporting 
decisions (Gormley et al. 2012; Tan 2013; Watts 2003), significant changes in 
characteristics of the banking sector are likely to affect borrowers’ financial reporting 
practices. The past century has seen the development and prosperity of the banking 
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industry. One noteworthy change is that banks no longer focus on regional business only; 
they expand their business nationwide and compete with one another. The expansion of 
banking business is important because it meets the demand for credits as the economy 
grows. More importantly, the increase in banking competition lowers the costs of debt 
(Johnson and Rice 2008; Jayaratne and Strahan 1998; Rice and Strahan 2010). 
The increase in competition in the banking industry affects banks’ ability to 
demand for conservative reporting from their clients, because greater competition among 
banks weakens their bargaining power relative to their clients’. Focusing on the U.S. 
audit market, Casterella et al. (2004) argue that when competition among auditors 
increases after a deregulation, auditors have weaker bargaining power, which, in turn, 
incites a price war over clients. Similarly, when the availability of credits is expanded as 
the credit supply competition increases, clients’ bargaining advantage over banks 
increases. In general, managers in client firms would prefer to deliver less conservative 
reports because conditional conservatism can reduce cumulative reported earnings, which 
in turn affects managers’ compensation (Ahmed et al. 2002, Watts 2003). Due to 
concerns about losing potential and existing clients when credit supply increases, banks 
may be willing to relax the constraints imposed on borrowing firms as well as their 
demand for conservative financial reporting. Therefore, borrowing firms are likely to 
report less conservatively after the competition among banks increases.  
To study changes in banking competition, I use a watershed event in the banking 
industry, the passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 
1994, as a positive shock to credit supply competition. Prior to the passage of the IBBEA, 
the geographic scope of banks was greatly limited. Legislative constraints severely 
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restricted interstate banking and branching. Although states started to pass laws that 
relaxed the restrictions on interstate banking on a reciprocal basis, interstate branching 
was still greatly restricted until the passage of the IBBEA in 1994. The IBBEA permitted 
full interstate branching in addition to full interstate banking (Rice and Strahan 2010). 
Thus, after the IBBEA was passed, expanding business across state borders became much 
more feasible for banks. Horvitz (1965) suggests that increasing the entry of new banks is 
one of the most effective ways to stimulate competition in the banking sector. Consistent 
with Horvitz (1965), prior studies document that both the number of bank branches and 
the credit supply competition among banks increase in each state in the post-IBBEA 
period (Johnson and Rice 2008; Rice and Strahan 2010). Such surges in credit supply 
competition have various consequences, including the structure of the banking market, 
firms’ external financing, and banks’ disclosure decisions (Burks et al. 2017; Cornaggia 
et al. 2015; Dick 2006; Rice and Strahan 2010; Zarutskie 2006).  
 To measure the change in conditional conservatism after the passage of the 
IBBEA, I extend the Basu (1997) model by incorporating a dummy variable to 
distinguish the pre- and post-IBBEA periods. As discussed in prior research (Armstrong 
et al. 2012; Bertrand et al. 2004), this model is an effective difference-in-differences 
design. Consistent with my prediction, I find that firms report less conservatively after 
their headquartered states adopt the IBBEA provisions. 
I further investigate whether the effect of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism 
varies across states and firms. States can adopt part of the IBBEA provisions and enact 
barriers on interstate banking and branching by passing legislations. If states are more 
open to interstate banking and branching, the increase in credit supply competition 
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among banks is likely to be greater. Therefore, I predict that the effect of increased 
banking competition on conditional conservatism is more pronounced in states that enact 
fewer restrictions on interstate banking and branching. The measure of the increase in 
competition among banks in each state after the passage of the IBBEA is based on a 
Branching Restrictiveness Index, formulated by Rice and Strahan (2010). I incorporate 
the Branching Restrictiveness Index into the Basu (1997) model and find that firms 
headquartered in states that impose fewer restrictions on interstate banking and branching 
report less conservatively than firms headquartered in states that impose more 
restrictions. In addition, some states enact more restrictive provisions than others 
(Johnson and Rice 2008). If states are more restrictive on interstate banking and 
branching, then banking competition in these states will be limited, and accordingly, 
firms headquartered in these states will exhibit a smaller decrease in conditional 
conservatism. Consistent with the prediction, I find that firms headquartered in states that 
enact less restrictive barriers exhibit a greater decline in conditional conservatism than 
firms in states that enact more restrictive barriers. I also find that the effect of the IBBEA 
on conditional conservatism is more pronounced for firms whose operations are more 
concentrated in their headquartered states, when clients are riskier, and for firms with 
lower analyst coverage. 
To enhance the credibility of the results, I conduct robustness tests to provide 
further evidence that the change in conditional conservatism is causally related to the 
IBBEA. First, if the decline in conditional conservatism is simply a time-trend or is 
induced by other factors prior to the passage of the IBBEA, then the change in 
conditional conservatism is likely to precede the passage of the IBBEA. However, I find 
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that the change in conditional conservatism is only observed after the IBBEA is adopted. 
The effect of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism lasts for two years after the IBBEA 
is passed. Second, I follow Burks et al. (2017) and conduct placebo tests using pseudo 
dates of the passage of the IBBEA in each state. The results show that there is no 
significant change in conditional conservatism in the pseudo post-IBBEA periods. Taken 
together, the results from the robustness tests support the argument that the passage of the 
IBBEA leads to changes in borrowing firms’ conditional conservatism. 
I conduct two additional tests to address the measurement issues with conditional 
conservatism in Basu (1997). First, I follow prior research (Collins et al. 2014; Jayaraman 
and Shivakumar 2013) and decompose earnings in the Basu (1997) model into accruals 
and cash flows. Jayaraman and Shivakumar (2013) and Collins et al. (2014) suggest that 
asymmetrically timely recognition of bad news should be reflected in accruals but not in 
cash flows. Collins et al. (2014) show that cash flow asymmetry is predicable based on 
firms’ life-cycle characteristics. Therefore, using earnings as the dependent variable in 
the Basu (1997) measure for conditional conservatism may be biased by cash flow 
asymmetry. I find that the decline of conditional conservatism after the passage of the 
IBBEA only exists in accruals but not in cash flows, indicating that the main results of 
the study are not attributed to cash flow asymmetry. Second, I follow Khan and Watts 
(2009) and use the firm-year specific measure for conditional conservatism. The main 
results remain unchanged when I use the alternative measure for conditional 
conservatism. 
 This study makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, this study 
shows an unintended consequence of increased competition in the banking industry. Prior 
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research has documented various benefits of banking competition, such as an increase in 
economic income (Besanko and Thakor 1992), a decrease in loan rates (Jayaratne and 
Strahan 1998), and better resource allocation (Gilje et al. 2016). However, only a handful 
of studies have investigated the effects of competition among banks on their clients’ 
financial reporting practices. My study presents evidence that a competitive banking 
market can induce changes in borrowing firms’ corporate financial reporting choices in 
such a way that losses are reported in a less timely fashion. Since firms’ conditional 
conservatism is essential to constraining managers’ opportunism, less conservative 
reporting will hurt not only debtholders but also shareholders (Watts 2003). As a result, 
share value is reduced (Watts 2003). My findings should be of interest to regulators. 
When the competition in banking industry increases, regulators should consider the 
unintended impacts on firms’ financial reporting and intensify their monitoring to ensure 
that the quality of corporate financial reporting remains uncompromised.  
Second, the findings in the study add evidence to the literature on determinants of 
conditional conservatism. Prior research has discussed the origins of firms’ financial 
reporting choices, specifically conditional conservatism, from various perspectives, 
including debt contracting demands, agency conflicts, litigation concerns, national 
culture, and political aspects (Basu 1995; Kanagaretnam et al. 2014; LaFond and Watts 
2008; Watts 2003; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Several studies employ exogenous 
shocks to investigate the causal effect of lenders’ demand on borrowers’ conditional 
conservatism (Aier et al. 2014; Jayaraman and Shivakumar 2013). However, these studies 
focus on shocks that introduce changes in the characteristics of borrowers. There is scant 
evidence on how the characteristics of lenders affect the reporting practices of borrowers. 
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Gormley et al. (2012) conduct a closely related study in which they use the staggered 
entry of foreign banks into India as an exogenous regulatory change in its banking 
industry. The authors find that foreign bank entry is associated with a higher level of 
conditional conservatism. Because foreign banks know little about Indian firms when 
they enter the market, they demand conservative financial reporting from clients to 
reduce information asymmetry. However, they acknowledge that the findings may not be 
applicable to similar regulatory changes in developed countries such as the United States. 
Using a different exogenous regulatory change in the banking industry in the United 
States, this study complements Gormley et al. (2012) and provides new insights into the 
role of the banking sector in shaping corporate financial reporting.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the 
history of banking and branching deregulation and develops testable hypotheses. Section 
3 describes the data and research design. Section 4 presents empirical results, and Section 
5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Background on Banking and Branching Deregulation 
Regulations related to interstate banking and branching have long been a 
controversial issue. Deregulation in the banking industry is a result of the rivalry between 
interested parties and economic growth (Rice and Strahan 2010). Small banks seek to 
shield themselves from competition with large banks, and consequently lobby political 
authorities against regulations that may increase competition in the local banking 
markets. Large banks, on the other hand, have incentives to expand their geographic 
scope, especially given the economic growth and the evolution of technology that makes 
remote operation and communication feasible. Consistent with the different incentives 
between small and large banks, Kroszner and Strahan (1999) find that deregulation in the 
banking industry took place more quickly in states with fewer small banks. Johnson and 
Rice (2008) document that the efforts and lobbies made by small banks greatly restricted 
branch banking by large banks.  
The dual banking system—both the federal government and states being entitled 
to issue bank charters—prompts another conflict of interest. National banks are chartered 
by the federal government to control the monetary system and to conduct business for the 
federal government (Blair and Kushmeider 2006). States, however, receive chartering 
fees from state banks, but not from banks incorporated outside the state or national banks. 
In addition, because state governments purchase and own shares of local banks, states 
have incentives to prohibit the geographic expansion1 of banks or to limit competition 
                                               
1 Johnson and Rice (2008), Page 75, document four means of geographic expansion: “(1) interstate 
banking (acquiring or establishing a charter in a state outside the main bank's home state); (2) interstate 
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among banks to enhance their revenue. For instance, the McFadden Act of 1927 dictated 
that national banks could only open branches in the city in which they were situated and 
that states had the right to prevent interstate branching. Arousing marked change, the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 allowed national banks to branch in the same areas as state 
banks. However, states then restricted intrastate branching to prevent the expansion of 
national banks in the states. (Johnson and Rice 2008; Kroszner and Strahan 1999).  
Despite the rivalry between interested parties, geographic expansion of banks and 
deregulation in the banking industry were inevitable—particularly due to the rapid 
economic growth at the time. Appendix A shows the timeline of banking and branching 
deregulation. In 1978, Maine was the first state to pass a law that relaxed the restrictions 
on acquisitions, but not branching, by out-of-state banks on a reciprocal basis. Over time, 
other states passed similar laws and joined the reciprocal agreements. By 1993, all states 
but Hawaii had permitted reciprocal interstate banking (Kroszner and Strahan 1999); 
however, interstate branching remained greatly restricted. 
To meet the increased credit demand from corporations and individuals and to 
balance the benefits between state-chartered and federal-chartered banks, Congress 
passed the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1994. The 
passage of the IBBEA was a watershed event as it aimed to remove the final barriers to 
full interstate banking and permit full interstate branching. The IBBEA struck down the 
McFadden Act of 1927 and superseded the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding 
                                               
branching (acquiring or establishing a branch office, an office which is not separately chartered or capitalized, 
in a state outside the main bank's home state); (3) intrastate banking (acquiring or establishing a charter within 
the main bank's home state); and (4) intrastate branching (acquiring or establishing a branch office within the 
main bank's home state).”. 
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Company Act of 1956 by allowing interstate acquisitions of banks, interstate 
consolidation of subsidiaries, interstate branching, and interstate de novo branching.2 
States had four options as to whether and when to adopt the following provisions: (1) 
passing legislation before June 1, 1997, to “opt out” of interstate acquisitions of banks3; 
(2) passing legislation to adopt interstate consolidation of subsidiaries and interstate de 
novo branching, otherwise these two provisions would not be effective; (3) passing 
legislation to adopt more desirable provisions, such as acquiring single branches without 
having to acquire the whole bank to enter the market; and (4) adopting provisions earlier 
than June 1, 1997, or adopting additional provisions later on (Burks et al. 2017; Johnson 
and Rice 2008; Rice and Strahan 2010; Zarutskie 2006).  
Given the strong restrictions on interstate banking and branching in previous 
legislations, the passage of the IBBEA created a positive shock to state-level credit 
supply competition. While certain reciprocal interstate banking was permitted prior to the 
IBBEA, those regulations were not as influential as the IBBEA for two reasons. First, as 
documented by Johnson and Rice (2008), the reciprocal regulations limited interstate 
banking to only a specific region, whereas the IBBEA had nationwide influence. Second, 
compared to interstate banking, interstate branching permitted by the IBBEA was less 
costly to implement and made the state-level credit markets more competitive. Interstate 
banking allowed banks to acquire out-of-state banks and convert subsidiaries into 
                                               
2 Johnson and Rice (2008), Page 86, define the provisions as follows. “Interstate bank acquisitions: 
acquisitions of separately chartered institutions. Interstate agency operations: allowing a bank subsidiary of 
a banking company to act as an agent of an affiliate of the banking company without being legally considered 
as a branch of that affiliate. Interstate branching: consolidation of acquired banks or individual branches into 
branches of the acquiring bank. De novo branching: establishment of a new branch office of a banking 
company across state lines, into states which have passed a statute expressly allowing it.” 
3 Only Texas and Montana passed laws to “opt out” of interstate branching provisions prior to June 
1, 1997. Eventually, Texas “opted in” in 1999, and Montana “opted in” in 2001.  
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branches, whereas interstate branching allowed banks to directly establish branches in 
areas with strong credit demand (Rice and Strahan 2010). Therefore, the entry of out-of-
state banks was easier after states adopted the interstate branching provisions of the 
IBBEA. 
2.2 Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Banks’ Demand for Conditional Conservatism from Borrowing Firms 
Prior literature documents that lenders are an effective monitor of their borrowers 
(Besanko and Kanatas 1993; Diamond 1984; Dichev and Skinner 2002; Nini et al. 2009; 
Nini et al. 2012). For instance, Dichev and Skinner (2002) document that debt covenants 
set by private lenders act as “trip wires” for borrowers. Tight covenants help private 
lenders closely scrutinize borrowers’ performance. Nini et al. (2009) find that banks 
impose explicit restrictions on firms’ capital expenditures in the covenants, which 
significantly reduce firms’ investments.  
Prior research shows that borrowers’ financial reporting information plays an 
important role in lending decisions and shaping debt contracts by reducing conflicts of 
interest between lenders and borrowers (Ahmed et al. 2002; Christensen and Nikolaev 
2012; Watts 2003; Zhang 2008). Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) show that accounting 
information required by debt covenants reduces agency costs and facilitates creditors’ 
monitoring of borrowers. Specifically, capital covenants (C-covenants), using balance 
sheet information, restrict the debt-to-equity ratio in firms’ capital structure to better align 
the interests between debtholders and shareholders. Performance covenants (P-
covenants), relying on information from income statements or cash flow statements in 
addition to balance sheets, transfer control to lenders by providing them with an option to 
12 
restrict managers’ behavior when clients do not perform well. P-covenants tend to be 
more timely indicators of distress, and thus serve as better “tripwires” than C-covenants 
in controlling agency problems. In other words, timely indicators of failure revealed by 
borrowers’ financial reports are an important and useful tool for lenders to mitigate 
agency concerns.  
Because conservative financial reporting recognizes economic losses in a more 
timely fashion than gains, conditional conservatism helps trigger “tripwires” and 
facilitates transferring control rights to lenders when borrowers are close to financial 
distress (Christensen and Nikolaev 2012). Extant literature has discussed why lenders 
demand conservative financial reporting from borrowers (Ahmed et al. 2002; Basu 1997; 
Beatty et al. 2008; Nikolaev 2010; Watts 2003; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Wittenberg-
Moerman 2008; Zhang 2008). Ahmed et al. (2002) document that conditional 
conservatism mitigates the dividend policy conflicts between fixed and residual 
claimants. Because the excessive payment of dividends transfers bondholders’ wealth to 
shareholders, restrictions on dividend policy are typically included in debt contracts. In 
this case, conservative reporting limits dividends paid to shareholders because 
conditional conservatism results in lower reported earnings upon which dividends are 
based. Thus, bondholders’ wealth is protected. Watts (2003) also argues that lenders have 
a strong incentive to demand conservative financial reporting from borrowers. As 
suggested by agency theory, when borrowers perform well, lenders are not paid above 
their contracted sum. However, in the event of bankruptcy, due to limited liability, 
lenders may lose their investments if borrowers’ net assets are not sufficient to cover the 
promised payments in the debt contracts. Because of this downside risk, lenders focus 
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more on the left tail of the earnings distribution in debt contracting. Such lower bound 
measures help lenders monitor borrowers’ ability to pay. In a similar vein, Zhang (2008) 
documents that conditional conservatism provides an early signal of default risk and thus 
trigger debt covenant violations more quickly. Such violations help reduce lenders’ 
downside risk by allowing them to take protective actions. 
2.2.2 The Economic Consequences of Banking Deregulation 
Prior literature documents various economic effects of banking deregulation. 
Deregulation in the banking sector fosters competition among banks because it relaxes 
the entry barriers into other banking markets (Besanko and Thakor 1992; Black and 
Strahan 2002; Stiroh and Stranhan 2003). Theoretical work shows that as the competition 
in the banking system increases, the level of economic income increases, the severity of 
business cycles declines, the equilibrium loan interest rates decrease, and the equilibrium 
deposit interest rates increase (Besanko and Thakor 1992; Smith 1998). Empirical 
evidence supports the conclusions in theory. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) present that 
the rate of real per capita growth in income increases following banking deregulation. 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) find that loan rates decrease after relaxing the restrictions 
on bank expansion. In addition, the increase in competition among banks after 
deregulation is related to the increase in the number of new incorporations, since banking 
competition stimulates innovation (Black and Strahan 2002). 
Banking competition also improves resource allocation in the banking industry 
and bank performance. Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) note that banking deregulation 
allows banks to enter new markets, but only better-managed and lower-cost banks can 
expand their business. Less efficient banks fail to compete with better-performing banks. 
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Thus, the market share of more efficient banks increases because resources are 
reallocated to them. This transfer of resources is consistent with the disciplinary role of 
competition and is a clear benefit of banking deregulation (Stiroh and Strahan 2003). In 
addition, as the network of bank branches is enlarged after deregulation, the capital 
allocation among different areas is more efficient. Deposits in one area can be transferred 
to another area with high growth prospects (Gilje et al. 2016). The consolidation among 
banks permitted by banking deregulation improves operation efficiency due to scale 
economies (Struck and Mandell 1983). Also, banks in more active takeover markets 
improve their performance to maximize their value (Schranz 1993). As a result, CEOs of 
banks in these markets get higher rewards (Hubbard and Palia 1995). 
As discussed in Section 2.1, state-level competition in the credit market 
significantly increases after the passage of the IBBEA, because of the entry of out-of-
state banks. The increased competition induced by the IBBEA is consistent with the 
argument by Horvitz (1965) that one of the most effective ways to stimulate competition 
in the banking industry is an increase in the entry of new banks. Using the Summary of 
Deposits from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), I calculate the average 
number of out-of-state branches per state in twelve years after the passage of the IBBEA. 
Appendix C shows that the average number of out-of-state branches per state increases 
from less than 38 in 1994 to 558 in 2005, and the average number of in-state branches 
decreases from 1,336 in 1994 to 1,045 in 2005.  
Because the passage of the IBBEA is a watershed deregulation event in the 
banking industry, numerous studies have used the IBBEA as a positive shock to 
competition among banks and have investigated the effect of banking competition on the 
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structure and quality of the banking market (Dick, 2006), borrowing and investment of 
private firms (Zarutskie 2006), small-firm finance (Rice and Strahan 2010), state-level 
innovation (Cornaggia et al. 2015), voluntary disclosure decisions of banks (Burks et al. 
2017), and banks’ loan loss provisions (Dou et al. 2017). However, prior research offered 
little evidence of the impact of banking competition on borrowers’ decision making, 
particularly their financial reporting choices. 
2.2.3 The Impact of the IBBEA on Borrowing Firms’ Conditional Conservatism 
Since borrowers’ conditional conservatism arises from lenders’ demand, any 
changes in banks’ demand for conservative financial reporting is likely to directly impact 
clients’ conditional conservatism. For instance, Martin and Roychowdhury (2015) argue 
that when lenders, especially banks, invest in credit default swaps (CDS), they receive 
payoffs from the counter-party of the CDS contracts if a loan defaults. Thus, the risk of a 
loan can be estimated based on the credit rating of the contractor of the CDS instead of 
the original borrower. Therefore, banks’ monitoring and demand for conservative 
reporting from borrowers are diminished by the investment in CDS. They find that 
borrowers’ financial reporting is less conservative in the post-CDS period. Tan (2013) 
argues that due to the information asymmetry between creditors and borrowers, creditors 
have a strong demand for information to verify the actual state of nature to protect their 
claims following debt covenant violations. He finds that firms report more conservatively 
immediately after debt covenant violations.  
Prior studies have employed different shocks that induce changes in conditional 
conservatism. Jayaraman and Shivakumar (2013) investigate changes in conditional 
conservatism among firms with greater debt-contracting demand after the passage of state 
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antitakeover laws. Because antitakeover laws require acquirers to pay higher prices for 
targets’ shares, the market for corporate control may not serve as an effective disciplining 
mechanism in influencing managers to act in shareholders’ interests. As such, managers’ 
power and entrenchment are likely to increase significantly, which aggravates agency 
conflicts between borrowers and lenders. Therefore, managers of firms with greater debt-
contracting demand are likely to signal their commitment to not harm lenders after 
antitakeover laws become effective. The authors find that firms under greater debt-
contracting pressure report more conservatively after the passage of antitakeover laws. 
Aier et al. (2014) establish a causal link between lenders’ demand and borrowers’ 
accounting conservatism using a setting where directors’ fiduciary duties were expanded 
to include lenders. Specifically, in 1991 Delaware court ruled that directors should act in 
the interests of lenders when firms approach insolvency. Lenders could sue directors if 
the board of a near insolvent firm acted too much in the interests of shareholders. Thus, 
directors have greater legal obligations and are more likely to act in the interests of 
lenders. The authors argue that such expansion in directors’ fiduciary duties induces an 
increase in conditional conservatism. Consistent with their argument, Aier et al. (2014) 
find that firms near insolvency report more conservatively after the Delaware court 
ruling.  
However, the settings used by prior studies focus primarily on shocks to 
borrowers’ characteristics instead of lenders’ characteristics. There is scant evidence on 
how lenders’ own characteristics affect their demand for conservative reporting. A 
noteworthy change among lenders, particularly banks, is the increase in competition in 
the market. The increase of credit supply competition in the banking industry is likely to 
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affect banks’ demand for conservative financial reporting. Specifically, banks’ bargaining 
power relative to that of clients is weakened after the increase of banking competition. 
Although banks still prefer conditional conservatism, the changes in bargaining power 
affect banks’ ability to demand conservative financial reporting from their clients. In the 
setting of the U.S. audit market, Casterella et al. (2004) document that the deregulation of 
the audit market in 1970s led to increased competition among accounting firms, which 
weakened auditors’ bargaining power, induced price wars, and reduced audit industry 
profitability in the 1980s. In a similar vein, banks’ clients will be in a stronger bargaining 
position when the credit supply competition is greater. When contracting with banks, 
managers of banks’ clients are likely to be less compelled to meet the demand for 
conservative financial reporting from banks. From the supply side, managers have 
incentives to report less conservatively because conservative financial reporting reduces 
managers’ private benefits and is costly to firms. Conditional conservatism reduces the 
income upon which managers’ compensation and investors’ evaluation are based (Ahmed 
et al. 2002; Watts 2003). Therefore, because managers possess relatively strong 
bargaining power in the negotiation process after a positive shock to credit supply 
competition, banks are likely to relax their demand for conservative reporting to retain 
clients in a more competitive banking market.  
I follow extant research and use the IBBEA as a positive shock to state-level 
credit supply competition. Based on the above discussion, I state the first hypothesis in 
the alternative form as follows: 
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H1: Firms’ financial reporting conservatism will decrease when the credit supply 
competition in the banking industry increases after the passage of the IBBEA 
in their headquartered states.  
I expect that the effect of the IBBEA will vary across states. As discussed in 
Section 2.1, not all states fully adopted the provisions when the IBBEA became effective 
in the states. Furthermore, the IBBEA allowed states to enact up to four restrictions4 on 
interstate banking and branching prior to June 1, 1997. The more restrictions a state 
enacts, the more difficult it is for out-of-state banks to enter the state, and consequently, 
the increase in credit supply competition will be suppressed. Moreover, Johnson and Rice 
(2008) conclude that Restrictions (3) and (4) are more restrictive than Restrictions (1) and 
(2). They find that Restrictions (1) and (2) do not significantly affect out-of-state branch 
growth. If branch growth is more limited in a state, the banking industry in the state will 
be less competitive. Therefore, I state the second hypothesis in the alternative form as 
follows:  
H2: The negative relation between the passage of the IBBEA and conditional 
conservatism will be less pronounced in states with greater restrictions. 
However, I may not find a negative relation between the credit supply 
competition among banks and borrowing firms’ conditional conservatism. As Stiroh and 
Strahan (2003) suggest, deregulation in the banking industry increases competitive 
pressure for both strong and weak performers in the banking market. When banks 
                                               
4 Rice and Strahan (2010), Page 867, summarize the four restrictions as follows: (1) “a minimum 
age of 3 years or more on target institutions of interstate acquirers”; (2) “a state does not permit de novo 
interstate branching”; (3) “a state does not permit the acquisition of individual branches by an out-of-state 
bank”; and (4) “a state imposes a deposit cap less than 30%”. 
19 
perform poorly and do not pass the market test, they have to exit the market. Resources 
will be transferred to better-performed banks (Jayaratne and Strahan 1998; Stiroh and 
Strahan 2003). Thus, to survive in a competitive market, banks are likely to screen their 
clients carefully to ensure that all payments can be collected from borrowers. In this case, 
banks are not likely to relax their demand for conservative financial reporting, since 
recognizing losses in a timely manner by borrowing firms helps trigger covenant 
violations early and allows banks to take protective actions (Zhang 2008). In other words, 
firms may experience an increase in conditional conservatism when the credit supply 
competition becomes greater. 
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3. Data and Research Design  
3.1 Measuring Conditional Conservatism 
To measure conditional conservatism, I follow Basu (1997) and use the following 
model:  
NIt = β0 + β1 NEGt + β2 RETt + β3 NEGt * RETt + εt                                            (1) 
In Equation (1), NI is net income in year t deflated by the market value of 
common equity at the end of year t-1. RET is cumulative buy-and-hold returns from nine 
months before the fiscal year end to three months after the fiscal year end. NEG is an 
indicator variable that equals one if RET is negative (bad news), and zero otherwise 
(good news). The coefficient on RET, β2, captures the sensitivity of earnings to good 
news, and β3, the coefficient on NEGt * RETt, measures the incremental sensitivity of 
earnings to bad news than to good news, thus representing the level of conditional 
conservatism.  
To investigate the effect of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism, I follow 
extant research (Armstrong et al. 2012; Bertrand et al. 2004; Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2003; Huang et al. 2016) and extend Equation (1) by incorporating a dummy variable 
POST in the model as follows: 
NIt = β0 + β1 NEGt + β2 RETt + β3 NEGt * RETt + β4 POST + β5 POST * NEGt  
+ β6 POST * RETt + β7 POST * NEGt * RETt + γ∑Controlst-1 + αs + αt + εt                   (2) 
NI, RET, and NEG are defined as before. POST is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the state where the firm is headquartered has passed the IBBEA by year t-1, and 
zero otherwise. In Equation (2), β7, the coefficient on POST * NEGt * RETt, represents 
the change in the incremental timeliness of bad news recognition in the post-IBBEA 
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period. I posit that banks reduce their demands for conservative financial reporting from 
their clients in the presence of an increased competition among banks after the passage of 
the IBBEA. Therefore, β7 is expected to be negative.  
Following prior literature (Beaver and Ryan 2005; Givoly et al. 2007; Gormley et 
al. 2012; Khan and Watts 2009; LaFond and Watts 2008), I control for the demands for 
conditional conservatism by incorporating a set of firm characteristic MTB, LEV, SIZE, 
and LITIG. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, calculated as the market value of common 
equity deflated by the book value of common equity. LEV is leverage, calculated as the 
sum of long-term debt and current debt deflated by total assets. SIZE is the market value 
of common equity. LITIG is the litigation risk calculated from Equation (4) of Kim and 
Skinner (2012). Since the distribution of LITIG is between zero and one, and Table 2 
shows that the distribution of MTB, LEV, and SIZE are skewed, I use the scaled decile 
ranks of MTB, LEV, and SIZE to estimate Equation (2) (LaFond and Roychowdhury 
2008; Ahmed and Duellman 2013). Each control variable is interacted with NEG, RET, 
and NEG * RET. To control for time-invariant differences across states and years, the 
model also includes state fixed effects αs, and year fixed effects αt. As discussed in prior 
research (Bertrand et al. 2004; Armstrong et al. 2012), Equation (2) is an effective 
difference-in-differences design. The staggered passage of the IBBEA means that the 
treatment group includes firms headquartered in states that passed the IBBEA in year t-1, 
and the control group consists of firms headquartered in states that have passed the 
IBBEA before year t-1 or will pass the IBBEA after year t-1. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level because the passage of the IBBEA occurs at the state level 
(Cornaggia et al. 2015; Gormley et al. 2012; Petersen 2009). 
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3.2 Measuring the Increase of Competition among Banks 
To measure the restrictiveness of interstate banking and branching across states, I 
follow Rice and Strahan (2010) and construct a variable INDEX. Rice and Strahan (2010) 
build a Branching Restrictiveness Index that ranges from zero to four. Specifically, they 
add one to the index if a state imposes one of the four restrictions. My INDEX variable is 
inversely related to the Branching Restrictiveness Index and ranges from zero to five. 
Specifically, INDEX equals zero if a state had not passed the IBBEA by year t-1, 
indicating that the state is the most restrictive on interstate banking and branching. 
INDEX equals one for states that have passed the IBBEA by year t-1 but enacted all four 
restrictions. Then, I add one to INDEX if states relax one of the four restrictions. Thus, 
INDEX equals five for states that do not impose any restrictions in year t-1. POST in 
Equation (2) is replaced with INDEX as follows: 
NIt = β0 + β1 NEGt + β2 RETt + β3 NEGt * RETt + β4 INDEX + β5 INDEX * NEGt  
+ β6 INDEX * RETt + β7 INDEX * NEGt * RETt + γ∑Controlst-1 + αs + αt + εt              (3) 
All variables are defined as in Equation (2). If the effect of the IBBEA on 
conditional conservatism is more pronounced in states more open to interstate banking 
and branching, the coefficient on the main interaction variable INDEX * NEGt * RETt, β7, 
will be negative. 
3.3 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Different states adopted the IBBEA at different times. Appendix B reports the 
effective dates of the IBBEA in all states obtained from Table 1 of Rice and Strahan 
(2010). Although states could adopt additional provisions after the IBBEA became 
effective, the effect of the IBBEA was greatest when the state first passed the Act. Thus, I 
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only keep the first date when the state adopted the provisions of the IBBEA. Alaska was 
the first to adopt the provisions retrospectively on January 1st, 1994. Twenty-seven states 
adopted provisions earlier than 1997. As required by the IBBEA, all states adopted at 
least the minimum provisions by June 1, 1997. 
Table 1 details the sample selection process and the sample distribution. Sample 
firms with non-missing headquarter information are obtained from COMPUSTAT, and 
stock return data are obtained from CRSP. After excluding firms without necessary data 
for computing variables in Equation (2) and firms in the financial industry (SIC codes 
6000 to 6999), the final sample consists of 17,924 firm-year observations (4,499 unique 
firms) during the sample period 1993 to 1998, as reported in Table 1, Panel A. The 
sample period starts one year prior to the first effective date of the IBBEA passage in 
Alaska and ends in 1998 since all states have passed the IBBEA by 1997. 
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics of sample firms. Net income (NI) has a 
mean of 0.019 and a median of 0.142, indicating that, in general, sample firms make 
profits during the sample period. Returns (RET), on average, is also positive. The 
distributions of control variables MTB, LEV, and SIZE are similar. Panel B and Panel C 
report the descriptive statistics for sample firms in the pre-IBBEA period and the post-
IBBEA period, respectively. In general, sample firms in the post-IBBEA period are less 
profitable and earn fewer returns than sample firms in the pre-IBBEA period. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The Effect of the IBBEA on Conditional Conservatism (H1) 
 Hypothesis H1 posits that to attract new clients and retain existing clients, banks 
are likely to reduce their demand for conservative financial reporting from their clients in 
the presence of increased competition. Thus, firms headquartered in states where the 
IBBEA is adopted are expected to report less conservatively in the post-IBBEA period.  
 Table 3 presents the multivariate regression results for Hypothesis H1. Column 
(1) of Table 3 reports the basic estimation results of Equation (2) without control 
variables or fixed effects, Column (2) reports the estimation results with control 
variables, and Column (3) reports the estimation results of Equation (2) with control 
variables and fixed effects. The coefficient on the interaction variable NEGt * RETt, β3, is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all three columns, indicating that 
sample firms recognize bad economic news in a more timely manner before the IBBEA is 
adopted in their headquarter state. More importantly, the coefficient on the main 
interaction variable POST * NEGt * RETt, β7, is negative and significant in all three 
columns. The results are consistent with hypothesis H1 that firms report less 
conservatively after their states of headquarters adopts the IBBEA. 
4.2 Interstate Banking and Branching Restrictions Enacted by States (H2) 
 In this section, I examine whether the effect of the IBBEA on conditional 
conservatism is uniform across states. Since the IBBEA allows states to enact restrictions 
on interstate banking and branching, it will be more difficult for out-of-state banks to 
enter the market if a state enacts restrictions. Competition among banks in states with 
fewer restrictions on interstate banking and branching will be greater than in states with 
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more restrictions on interstate banking and branching. Therefore, I predict that the 
negative relation between the IBBEA and conditional conservatism will be more 
pronounced in states more open to interstate banking and branching.  
 Table 4 reports the branching restrictiveness among states and the multivariate 
regression results for Hypothesis 2. Panel A of Table 4 replicates the Branching 
Restrictiveness Index constructed by Rice and Strahan (2010). Branching Restrictiveness 
Index is added one if: (1) states require minimum age of institution for acquisitions; (2) 
states do not allow de novo Interstate Branching; (3) states do not allow interstate 
branching by acquisition of single branch or portions of institution; (4) states impose 
statewide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. Among all the states, 38 states enact 
Restriction (1), 38 states enact Restriction (2), 33 states enact Restriction (3), and 14 
states enact Restriction (4). Panel B summarizes the Branching Restrictiveness Index. 
Ten states do not impose any banking and branching restrictions, while 12 states enact all 
four restrictions.  
 Although Restrictions (1) and (2) are more commonly enacted by states, Johnson 
and Rice (2008) conclude that Restrictions (3) and (4) are more restrictive. Thus, the 
banking industry in states that enact Restrictions (3) and (4) will be less competitive, and 
hence, firms headquartered in these states will exhibit a smaller decline in conditional 
conservatism after the IBBEA is passed. To empirically test the conjecture, I categorize 
the sample into three groups: (1) firms headquartered in states that enact both Restrictions 
(3) and (4); (2) firms headquartered in states that enact either Restriction (3) or (4) but not 
both; (3) firms headquartered in states that enact neither Restriction (3) nor (4). Panel B 
of Table 4 shows that most states enact either Restriction (3) or (4) but not both. 
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 Panel C of Table 4 reports the multivariate regression results for Hypothesis 2. As 
in Table 3, Column (1) of Table 4 reports the baseline estimation results without control 
variables or fixed effects, Column (2) reports the estimation results after including 
control variables, and Column (3) reports the estimation results with both control 
variables and fixed effects. As predicted, the coefficient on INDEX * NEGt * RETt, β7, is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all three columns. The results 
indicate that firms headquartered in states more open to interstate banking and branching 
report less conditionally conservatively after the IBBEA is passed than firms 
headquartered in states with restrictions on interstate banking and branching. In other 
words, the effect of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism is more pronounced in states 
that impose fewer interstate banking and branching restrictions. 
 Panel D of Table 4 reports the multivariate regression results conditional on the 
restrictiveness of provisions. Column (1), (2), and (3) report the results of group (1), (2), 
and (3) respectively. The coefficient on POST * NEGt * RETt, β7, is insignificant in 
Column (1) and is negative and statistically significant at 1% level in Column (2) (=-
0.112, t-value=-4.22) and column (3) (=-0.105, t-value=-4.09). The results indicate that 
firms headquartered in states that enact both Restrictions (3) and (4) do not change the 
level of conditional conservatism in their financial reporting after the IBBEA is passed. 
Firms headquartered in states that relax Restrictions (3) and (4) report less conservatively 
after the IBBEA is passed. The comparison tests show that the difference between the 
coefficients in Columns (1) and (2), and Columns (1) and (3), are statistically significant. 
Taken together, the results in Table 4 are consistent with the conjecture that firms 
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headquartered in states with more competitive banking industry report less 
conservatively.  
4.3 Geographic Concentration of Firms’ Operations 
Thus far, I have shown that firms headquartered in states where the IBBEA is 
adopted report less conservatively in the post-IBBEA period and the effect of the IBBEA 
on conditional conservatism is more pronounced in states more open to interstate banking 
and branching. In this section, I explore the cross-sectional variation of the effect of the 
IBBEA conditional on the geographic concentration of firms’ operations in their 
headquartered states. If a firm’s operations are more concentrated in their headquartered 
state, it is more likely that the firm’s financial reporting choices are largely influenced by 
banks in its headquartered state rather than out-of-state banks. Therefore, when the 
competition among banks increases in the firm’s headquartered state, the effect of 
competition on firms’ financial reporting would be more pronounced for firms whose 
operation is more concentrated in the state. 
Table 5 reports the multivariate regression results for the test. The geographic 
concentration of firms’ operations is measured based on Garcia and Norli (2012). The 
authors count state names from firms’ 10-K annual reports as a proxy for geographic 
dispersion of business operations. I sort firms within each state into tercile portfolios 
based on their concentration of operations in the headquartered states in the year prior to 
the passage of the IBBEA, and estimate Equation (2) for the bottom (Column 1) and top 
(Column 2) groups separately. The coefficient on POST * NEGt * RETt in Column (1) is 
negative and insignificant (=-0.043, t-value=-0.77), indicating that firms with less 
business concentration in headquartered states do not exhibit a significant change in 
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conditional conservatism after the IBBEA is passed. The coefficient in Column (2) is 
negative and significant (=-0.146, t-value=-4.55), indicating that firms operating more in 
headquartered states report less conservatively in the post-IBBEA period. The difference 
between the two coefficients is statistically significant (p-value=0.08). The results in 
Table 5 are consistent with the prediction that the change in conditional conservatism in 
the post-IBBEA period is more pronounced for firms whose operations are more 
concentrated in their headquartered states. 
4.4 Banks’ Downside Risk  
 In this section, I investigate whether the downside risk banks face plays a role in 
the relation between the IBBEA and conditional conservatism. Because of the downside 
risk, banks demand conservative financial reporting from their clients (Watts 2003). 
Banks’ demand for conservative financial reporting is particularly high for firms more 
dependent on banks for their external financing, since banks are exposed to higher 
downside risk if their clients have a high level of debts in place. On one hand, when 
banks face greater downside risk, it is more costly for them to relax their demand for 
conditional conservatism from borrowing firms. Therefore, banks may still require 
conservative financial reporting from clients more dependent on them, even if the credit 
supply competition increases and banks’ bargaining power is weakened. In this case, the 
effect of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism will be more pronounced for less 
financially constrained firms. On the other hand, since banks’ demands for conservative 
reporting are higher for more financially constrained firms, if banks relax their demands 
after the credit supply competition increases, the effect would be more obvious for firms 
whose banks face higher downside risk. Firms less dependent on banks are not subject to 
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as many demands for conditional conservatism in the first place, so the effect of relaxing 
demands for conservative financial reporting will not be pronounced among those firms.   
 Table 6 reports the multivariate regression results for the cross-sectional test. I 
employ two measures for banks’ downside risk: Leverage and KZ-Index. Leverage is the 
leverage ratio measured as the sum of long-term debt and current debt deflated by total 
assets. KZ-Index is the financial constraint index computed following Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) and Lamont et al. (2001)5. Firms with a higher leverage ratio or higher 
KZ-Index are more likely to be dependent on banks. I sort firms within each state into 
tercile portfolios based on their dependence on banks in the year prior to the passage of 
the IBBEA, and estimate Equation (2) for the bottom and top groups separately. Columns 
(1) and (2) report the results using Leverage as the partitioning variable. The coefficient 
on POST * NEGt * RETt in Column (1) is negative and insignificant (=-0.027, t-value=-
0.94), indicating that the change in conditional conservatism in the post-IBBEA period is 
not significant for firms with a lower leverage ratio. In Column (2) the coefficient on 
POST * NEGt * RETt is negative and significant (=-0.180, t-value=-4.06), indicating that 
firms with a higher leverage ratio report less conservatively after the passage of the 
IBBEA. The comparison test reveals that the difference between the coefficients on 
POST * NEGt * RETt in Columns (1) and (2) is statistically significant (p-value=0.00).  
 Columns (3) and (4) present the results using KZ-Index as the measure for firms’ 
dependence on banks. Similarly, the coefficient on POST * NEGt * RETt in Column (3) is 
                                               
5 The equation used to calculate the KZ-Index is: KZ-Index= −1.002 CFit / ATit−1 − 39.368 DIVit / 
ATit−1 − 1.315 CASHit / ATit−1 + 3.139 LEVit, where CFit is cash flow deflated by lagged assets ATit−1, DIVit 
is cash dividend deflated by lagged assets ATit−1, CASHit is cash balance deflated by lagged assets ATit−1, 
and LEVit is the leverage ratio. 
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negative and insignificant (=-0.027, t-value=-0.94), indicating that firms with lower KZ-
Index do not exhibit changes in conditional conservatism in the post-IBBEA period. The 
coefficient on POST * NEGt * RETt in Column (4) is negative and significant (=-0.131, t-
value=-2.45), meaning that firms with a higher KZ-Index report less conservatively after 
the IBBEA is passed in the headquartered states. As shown by the comparison test, the 
difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant (p-value=0.01). Taken 
together, the results in Table 6 are consistent with the prediction that the effect of the 
IBBEA on conditional conservatism is more pronounced for firms with which banks face 
higher downside risk. 
4.5 The Moderating Effect of External Monitoring Mechanisms 
 In this section, I examine the moderating effect of external monitors on the 
relation between the IBBEA and conditional conservatism. Prior research documents that 
the level of conditional conservatism is affected by existing monitoring mechanisms. 
Specifically, firms with stronger monitoring mechanisms in place tend to be more 
conditionally conservative than firms subject to weaker monitoring mechanisms (Shi and 
You 2016; Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012). It is possible that the effect of the IBBEA on 
conditional conservatism is subject to the impact of existing monitoring mechanisms on 
conditional conservatism. Following prior research, I use two proxies for monitoring 
mechanisms: analyst following and dedicated institutional ownership. Shi and You 
(2016) documents that firms report more conservatively after an exogenous drop in 
analyst coverage. Thus, firms with a greater analyst following are likely to report more 
conservatively than firms with a lesser analyst following. With greater analyst following 
in place, firms may not change the level of conditional conservatism even if banks relax 
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the demand for conservative reporting. Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) find that firms 
with higher monitoring institutional ownership report more conservatively. Therefore, I 
predict that the effect of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism is more pronounced for 
firms with a lesser analyst following or lower institutional ownership. 
Table 7 reports the multivariate regression results for the test. Analyst coverage 
data are obtained from the I/B/E/S. Analyst following of a firm is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts who issue earnings forecasts for the 
firm in the year prior to the IBBEA. For firms without analyst coverage data, analyst 
following is set to zero. I follow Bushee (2001) and Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) and 
calculate the percentage of ownership by dedicated institutional investors. Institutional 
ownership data are from Thomson Reuters Stock Ownership and the classification of 
dedicated institutions is provided by Bushee (2001)6. Like prior tests, I sort sample firms 
into tercile portfolios based on their analyst following or dedicated institutional 
ownership, and estimate Equation (2) for the bottom and top groups separately. The 
negative and significant coefficient on POST * NEGt * RETt (-0.092, t-value=-2.15) in 
Column (1) indicates that firms with a lesser analyst following report less conservatively 
in the post-IBBEA period. Consistent with the prediction, firms with a greater analyst 
following do not change the level of conditional conservatism (0.005, t-value=0.15). The 
comparison test shows that the difference between the coefficient on POST * NEGt * 
RETt between Column (1) and Column (2) is statistically significant at 10% level. The 
coefficient on POST * NEGt * RETt in Column (3) is negative and significant (=-0.086, t-
value=-2.79), indicating that firms with low dedicated institutional ownership report less 
                                               
6 http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html 
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conservatively after the IBBEA is passed. The coefficient on POST * NEGt * RETt in 
Column (4) is insignificant. However, the difference between the two coefficients is not 
statistically significant (p=0.18). The results indicate that dedicated institutional 
ownership does not have a significant moderating effect on the relation between the 
IBBEA and conditional conservatism. Taken together, the results in Table 7 support the 
argument that the effect of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism is more pronounced 
for firms with lower analyst coverage.   
4.6 Robustness Checks 
4.6.1 Dynamic Effects of the IBBEA  
 In this section, I examine the dynamic effects of the IBBEA on conditional 
conservatism. If the decline in conditional conservatism is simply a time-trend effect that 
occurs before the passage of the IBBEA, or is induced by other factors before the IBBEA 
is passed rather than the increase in credit supply competition after the passage of the 
IBBEA, then the decline in conditional conservatism is likely to be observed prior to the 
passage of the IBBEA. Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Armstrong et al. 
(2012), I construct indicator variables IBBEA(-n) for firms in the states that will adopt the 
IBBEA in N (N=0, 1, 2, and 3) years and IBBEA(n) for firms in the states that have adopted 
IBBEA for N years. POST in Equation (2) is replaced with IBBEA(-n) and IBBEA(n). If 
the decline in conditional conservatism is a time-trend effect or is related to factors other 
than the passage of the IBBEA, then the effects of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism 
should precede the passage of the IBBEA. Alternatively, if the passage of the IBBEA leads 
to less conservative reporting by borrowing firms, then the effects of the IBBEA on 
conditional conservatism should only be observed after the IBBEA is adopted. In other 
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words, if the passage of the IBBEA indeed causes the reduction in conditional conservatism, 
then only the coefficients on IBBEA(n) (n>0) should be negative and statistically 
significant.  
 Panel A of Table 8 presents the multivariate regression results for this test. For 
brevity, I only report the coefficients of the three-way interaction variables. Only the 
coefficients on IBBEA(1) * NEG t * RET t and IBBEA(2) * NEG t * RET t are negative and 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that firms report less conservatively only after the 
passage of the IBBEA. Moreover, the negative and insignificant coefficient on IBBEA(3) 
* NEG t * RET t indicates that the IBBEA no longer has an effect on conditional 
conservatism after two years of its adoption. This result reveals that banks tend to relax 
their requirement for conservative financial reporting only during the first two years when 
they want to expand their business and attract clients in a competitive market.  
4.6.2 Placebo Tests 
 In the above section, I have shown that the change in conditional conservatism is 
causally related to the passage of the IBBEA. To enhance the credibility of the results, I 
conduct placebo tests following Burks et al. (2017). In this test, I re-estimate Equation (2) 
assuming that the pseudo year of adopting the IBBEA in each state is N (N=4, 3, and 2) 
years earlier than the true date of adoption. Since there is no large shock to competition 
among banks N years before the IBBEA, I predict that the coefficient on the main 
interaction variable POST * NEGt * RETt in the placebo tests should be insignificant. The 
results in Panel B of Table 8 are consistent with the prediction. In all three columns, the 
coefficients on POST * NEGt * RETt are insignificant, indicating that there is no significant 
change in conditional conservatism in the pseudo post-IBBEA periods. The results support 
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the argument that the relation between the IBBEA and conditional conservatism is not 
spurious.  
4.6.3 Historical States of Headquarters 
 In this section, I check whether the main results remain unchanged using historical 
headquarter information, since COMPUSTAT only reports current information of firms’ 
headquartered states. Historical headquartered state information is parsed by Bill 
McDonald from 10-Ks on Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR)7. Panel C of Table 8 reports the 
results using historical headquarter information. Column (1) of Panel C reports the 
estimation results without control variables and fixed effects, Column (2) reports the results 
with control variables, and Column (3) reports the results with both control variables and 
fixed effects. The coefficients on POST * NEG t * RET t is negative and statistically 
significant in all three columns, indicating that firms report less conservatively after their 
states of headquarters adopt the IBBEA. The results in Panel C of Table 8 are similar to 
the main results in Table 3.  
4.7 Measurement Issues 
4.7.1 Cash Flow Asymmetry 
  In this section, I examine the measurement issues of conditional conservatism. 
First, I address the concern with cash flow asymmetry. Collins et al. (2014) suggest 
researchers use accrual-based measures to test conditional conservatism. They argue that 
earnings are composed of accruals and operating cash flow, and the asymmetric 
recognition of good and bad news is not reflected in the recognition of cash flow. 
                                               
7 https://sraf.nd.edu/data/augmented-10-x-header-data/ 
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Therefore, when using earnings as the dependent variable to measure conditional 
conservatism, results can be biased by the noise induced by cash flow asymmetry. 
Specifically, Collins et al. (2014) show that cash flow asymmetry varies systematically 
with predictable firm characteristics in different life-cycle stages. Firms in their early life-
cycle stages exhibit greater cash flow asymmetry. Removing the cash flow component 
from earnings when measuring conditional conservatism effectively mitigate many biases 
documented in previous research, such as Givoly et al. (2007) and Patatoukas and 
Thomas (2011). Following Collins et al. (2014), I decompose NI t in Equation (3) into 
accruals (ACC t) and operating cash flow (CFO t). CFO t is obtained from the statement 
of cash flows and ACC t is calculated as the difference between NI t and CFO t. Then, I 
estimate Equation (3) using ACC t and CFO t as the dependent variables, respectively.  
 Panel A of Table 9 reports the multivariate regression results for the test. The 
dependent variables are ACC t and CFO t in Columns (1) and (2), respectively. The 
coefficient on POST * NEG t * RET t is negative and statistically significant in Column 
(1) (=-0.075, t-value=-2.39), while the coefficient on POST * NEG t * RET t is 
insignificant in Column (2). The results indicate that the change in conservatism is only 
observed in accruals but not in operating cash flow. Therefore, the results reported in this 
study using augmented Basu (1997) measure for conditional conservatism are unlikely to 
be biased by cash flow asymmetry. 
4.7.2 Firm-Specific Measure of Conditional Conservatism 
 Second, I use an alternative measure of conditional conservatism suggested by 
Khan and Watts (2009). Khan and Watts (2009) develop a firm-specific measure of 
conditional conservatism, C-SCORE, by substituting MTB, LEV, and SIZE into Basu 
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(1997) estimation regression. Following Khan and Watts (2009), I calculate the C-
SCORE for each firm-year observation and use it as the dependent variable and estimate 
the following model:  
C-SCOREt = β0 + β1 POST + β2 LITIGt-1 + αs + εt                                               (4)                 
Variable definitions in Equation (4) are the same as in Equation (2). LITIG is the 
only control variable because MTB, LEV, and SIZE are used to calculate the C-SCORE. I 
exclude year-fixed effects in the regression because Panel D of Table 1 shows that the 
distribution post-IBBEA sample is concentrated in year 1996 to 1998. Specifically, half 
of the observations in the post-IBBEA sample are in the year of 1998. Therefore, 
including year-fixed effects in Equation (4) is likely to absorb most of the main effect. 
The coefficient on POST, β1, captures the change in conditional conservatism after the 
IBBEA is passed.   
 Panel B of Table 9 presents the results of estimating Equation (4). Column (1) 
reports the estimation results of Equation (4) without control variables or fixed effects, 
Column (2) reports the estimation results with the control variable LITIG, and Column 
(3) reports the estimation results of Equation (4) with the control variable LITIG and 
state-fixed effects. The coefficient on POST, β1, is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level in all three columns, indicating that sample firms recognize bad economic 
news in a less timely manner after the IBBEA is adopted in their headquartered state.  
To control for systematic variation in conditional conservatism over time while 
mitigating the multicollinearity problem, I replace POST in Equation (4) with INDEX, 
add year fixed effects, and estimate the following model:  
C-SCOREt = β0 + β1 INDEX + β2 LITIGt-1 + αs + αt + εt                                     (5)                 
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The variable definition of INDEX is the same as in Equation (3). The coefficient 
on INDEX, β1, represents the change in conditional conservatism after the IBBEA is 
passed in states with different restrictiveness.  
Panel C of Table 9 presents the results of estimating Equation (5). Column (1) 
reports the estimation results of Equation (5) without control variables or fixed effects, 
Column (2) reports the estimation results with the control variable LITIG, and Column 
(3) reports the estimation results of Equation (5) with the control variable LITIG and 
fixed effects. The coefficient on POST, β1, is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level in all three columns, indicating that firms report less conservatively after the 
IBBEA is adopted in their headquartered state, and that firms headquartered in more open 
states exhibit greater decrease in conditional conservatism after than firms headquartered 
in less open states. Taken together, the results in Panel B and Panel C of Table 9 show 
that the main results remain unchanged using C-SCORE as the alternative measure of 
conditional conservatism.  
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5. Conclusions 
Using the staggered passage of the IBBEA as a positive shock to state-level credit 
supply competition among banks in the U.S., this study investigates the impact of credit 
supply competition in the banking industry on accounting conservatism in clients’ 
financial reporting. The IBBEA permitted full interstate banking and branching that had 
been greatly restricted in history. Banks can expand their business across state borders by 
acquisitions or de novo branching after a state adopts the IBBEA provisions. With new 
banks entering the market, state-level competition among banks increases significantly 
and the availability of credit expands.  
Prior studies document that information from clients’ financial statements is 
essential to lenders when making lending decisions. The contracting demand from banks 
also affects their clients’ financial reporting practices. Facing significant downside risk, 
banks require their clients to recognize bad news in a more timely manner. In other 
words, banks demand conservative financial reporting from their clients.  
However, an increase in competition on the credit supply market weakens their 
bargaining power in the negotiation process. As such, banks are likely to relax their 
requirement of conservative reporting. Therefore, I predict that firms are likely to report 
less conservatively after the IBBEA is passed in their headquartered states. Consistent 
with the prediction, this study documents a negative relation between the passage of the 
IBBEA and conditional conservatism. The relation is more pronounced in states more 
open to interstate banking and branching. The decreases in conditional conservatism are 
concentrated among firms headquartered in states that impose more restrictions on 
interstate banking and branching, firms that have more operations in their headquartered 
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states, firms with which banks face higher downside risk, and firms with less analyst 
following. 
The findings of the study complement the findings in Gormley et al. (2012) and 
contribute to the literature on the determinants of conditional conservatism. To the extent 
that the increase in competition in the banking industry may have negative impacts on 
firms’ financial reporting, the study is particularly of interest to regulators. The findings 
highlight the necessity of evaluating potential negative effects of regulatory changes in 
the banking industry and intensifying monitoring of banks and their clients after the 
IBBEA becomes effective.  
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State Effective Date  State Effective Date 
AK 01/01/1994  MT 09/29/1995 
AL 05/31/1997  NC 07/01/1995 
AR 06/01/1997  ND 05/31/1997 
AZ 09/01/1996  NE 05/31/1997 
CA 09/28/1995  NH 06/01/1997 
CO 06/01/1997  NJ 04/17/1996 
CT 06/27/1995  NM 06/01/1996 
DC 06/13/1996  NV 09/29/1995 
DE 09/29/1995  NY 06/01/1997 
FL 06/01/1997  OH 05/21/1997 
GA 06/01/1997  OK 05/31/1997 
HI 06/01/1997  OR 07/01/1997 
IA 04/04/1996  PA 07/06/1995 
ID 09/29/1995  RI 06/20/1995 
IL 06/01/1997  SC 07/01/1996 
IN 06/01/1997  SD 03/09/1996 
KS 09/29/1995  TN 06/01/1997 
KY 06/01/1997  TX 08/28/1995 
LA 06/01/1997  UT 06/01/1995 
MA 08/02/1996  VA 09/29/1995 
MD 09/29/1995  VT 05/30/1996 
ME 01/01/1997  WA 06/06/1996 
MI 11/29/1995  WI 05/01/1996 
MN 06/01/1997  WV 05/31/1997 
MO 09/29/1995  WY 05/31/1997 
MS 06/01/1997    
 
Note: This table is obtained from Table 1 of Rice and Strahan (2010).  
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Year 1994 1997 2000 2005 
Mean (Std. Dev) 
Number of Out-
of-State 
Branches Per 
State 
37.98 (126.20) 189.54 (464.92) 361.61 (1027.56) 558.00 (1505.84) 
Proportion of 
Out-of-State 
Branches to 
Total Branches 
0.0298 (0.0747) 0.0882 (0.1252) 0.1366 (0.1856) 0.3488 (0.2074) 
 
Note: This table replicates Table 3 of Johnson and Rice (2008) that summarizes the changes of the number 
of out-of-state branches per state after the IBBEA was passed. The banking branch data is obtained from 
the Summary of Deposits from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure is created based on the average number of branches per state. The banking branch data is 
obtained from the Summary of Deposits from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). See Figure 1 
of Johnson and Rice (2008) for more details on the number of branches, banks and bank holding companies 
after the IBBEA was passed. 
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Variables Definitions 
ACC The difference between net income and operating cash flow in year t deflated by 
the market value of common equity at the end of year t-1. 
  
CFO Operating cash flow (COMPUSTAT items OANCF – XIDOC) in year t deflated 
by the market value of common equity at the end of year t-1. 
  
C-SCORE Conditional conservatism measure calculated following Khan and Watts (2009). 
  
IBBEA IBBEA (-n) is an indicator variable for firms in the states that will pass IBBEA in n 
years, and IBBEA (n) is an indicator variable for firms in the states that passed 
IBBEA n years ago. 
  
INDEX Five minus the Branching Restrictiveness Index in Table 4. INDEX equals zero if 
the state had not passed the IBBEA by year t-1, equals one for states that enact all 
four restrictions by year t-1, and equals five for states that enact no restrictions by 
year t-1. 
  
LEV The scaled decile rank of leverage, calculated as the sum of long-term debt and 
current debt deflated by total assets. 
  
LITIG The litigation risk calculated from Equation (4) of Kim and Skinner (2012). 
  
MTB The scaled decile rank of market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of 
common equity deflated by book value of common equity. 
  
NEG An indicator variable that equals one if RET is negative, and zero otherwise. 
  
NI Net income of year t deflated by the market value of common equity at the end of 
year t-1. 
  
POST An indicator variable that equals one if the state had passed the IBBEA by year t-1. 
  
RET Cumulative buy-and-hold returns from nine months before the fiscal year end to 
three months after the fiscal year end. 
  
SIZE The scaled decile rank of market value of common equity. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection and Distribution 
Panel A: Sample Selection   
 Number of 
Observations 
Number 
of 
Firms 
U.S. firms during fiscal year [1993, 1998] with non-missing headquarter 
information from Compustat 61,972 13,570 
 
Restrictions: 
   
After removing observations if the firm’s permno and stock return data are 
missing 44,411 10,625 
After removing observations if the firm’s financial data are missing 22,081 5,751 
After removing observations if the firm is in the financial industry  17,967 4,513 
After removing observations if the firm is headquartered in major territories 17,924 4,499 
Final Sample 17,924 4,499 
 
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by State 
State 
Number of 
Observations 
Number of 
Firms 
 
State 
Number of 
Observations 
Number of 
Firms 
AK 8 2  MT 15 4 
AL 128 31  NC 372 88 
AR 96 21  ND 10 3 
AZ 266 73  NE 62 16 
CA 2,362 658  NH 114 27 
CO 420 116  NJ 844 218 
CT 398 97  NM 24 7 
DC 32 7  NV 147 46 
DE 71 17  NY 1,499 366 
FL 739 202  OH 752 178 
GA 484 126  OK 163 43 
HI 31 7  OR 179 46 
IA 110 22  PA 798 188 
ID 46 9  RI 72 16 
IL 879 195  SC 78 21 
IN 233 57  SD 36 8 
KS 110 27  TN 269 72 
KY 99 22  TX 1,806 458 
LA 112 28  UT 169 43 
MA 961 238  VA 476 114 
MD 277 76  VT 29 8 
ME 45 8  WA 246 62 
MI 436 102  WI 375 78 
MN 661 154  WV 19 6 
MO 328 77  WY 1 1 
MS 37 10     
55 
Table 1. – Continued  
Panel C: Sample Distribution by Effective Year 
Effective Year Number of States Number of 
Observations 
Number of Firms 
1994 1 8 2 
1995 16 7,883 2,020 
1996 11 3,001 742 
1997 23 7,032 1,735 
Total 51 17,924 4,499 
 
 
Panel D: Sample Distribution by Fiscal Year 
Fiscal Year Number of 
Observations 
Pre-IBBEA Post-IBBEA 
1993 2,790 2,790 0 
1994 2,850 2,850 0 
1995 2,904 2,903 1 
1996 3,073 1,880 1,193 
1997 3,182 1,251 1,931 
1998 3,125 0 3,125 
Total 17,924 11,674 6,250 
 
Note: Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample selection procedure. The final sample includes firm-year 
observations with non-missing data for necessary variables in Equation (2). Panel B presents the effective 
dates of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 50 states and 
Washington D.C., and the sample distribution in each state. The effective dates are replicated from Table 1 
of Rice and Strahan (2010). Panel C presents the sample distribution by effective year. Panel D presents the 
sample distribution in each fiscal year of the sample period. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min 
Lower 
Quartile 
Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Max 
Panel A: Full Sample (N=17,924) 
NI t 0.019 0.142 -0.672 -0.002 0.053 0.084 0.329 
RET t 0.142 0.528 -0.738 -0.187 0.063 0.354 2.364 
MTB t-1 2.822 2.789 0.333 1.272 1.962 3.228 17.953 
LEV t-1 0.221 0.178 0.000 0.056 0.206 0.348 0.711 
SIZE t-1 5.134 1.985 1.234 3.654 4.959 6.517 10.141 
LITIG t-1 0.219 0.251 0.006 0.048 0.114 0.284 0.997 
Panel B: Pre-IBBEA Sample (N=11,674) 
NI t 0.022 0.145 -0.672 0.004 0.056 0.088 0.329 
RET t 0.186 0.516 -0.738 -0.124 0.099 0.376 2.364 
MTB t-1 2.700 2.735 0.333 1.217 1.856 3.071 17.953 
LEV t-1 0.223 0.176 0.000 0.062 0.208 0.348 0.711 
SIZE t-1 4.993 1.993 1.234 3.492 4.798 6.381 10.141 
LITIG t-1 0.214 0.249 0.006 0.047 0.111 0.274 0.997 
Panel C: Post-IBBEA Sample (N=6,250) 
NI t 0.014 0.137 -0.672 -0.013 0.046 0.078 0.329 
RET t 0.062 0.541 -0.738 -0.308 -0.023 0.309 2.364 
MTB t-1 3.051 2.874 0.333 1.418 2.179 3.523 17.953 
LEV t-1 0.219 0.181 0.000 0.043 0.202 0.348 0.711 
SIZE t-1 5.396 1.942 1.234 3.957 5.256 6.709 10.141 
LITIG t-1 0.228 0.255 0.006 0.051 0.118 0.307 0.997 
 
Panel D: Pearson and Spearman Correlations (N=17,924) 
  
NI t RET t MTB t-1 LEV t-1 SIZE t-1 LITIG t-1 
NI t 1.000 0.386 -0.129 0.071 0.066 -0.155 
RET t 0.229 1.000 -0.083 0.005 0.022 -0.078 
MTB t-1 -0.033 -0.051 1.000 -0.118 0.379 0.226 
LEV t-1 -0.007 -0.012 -0.048 1.000 0.070 -0.011 
SIZE t-1 0.154 -0.049 0.190 0.048 1.000 0.161 
LITIG 
t-1 -0.112 -0.027 0.181 -0.045 0.002 1.000 
 
Note: This table presents summary statistics for variables in the main regression of Equation (2). Panel A 
reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample. Panel B and Panel C report the descriptive statistics for 
pre- and post-IBBEA sample, respectively. In Panel D, coefficients below (above) the diagonal presents 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation. Correlation coefficients in bold are significant at 0.1 level. See Table A2 
for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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Table 3. The Effect of the IBBEA on Conditional Conservatism 
Dependent Variable: NIt      
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Coefficient t-
value 
 Coefficient t-
value 
 Coefficient t-
value 
NEG t 0.001 (0.31)  -0.016 (-1.66)  -0.016 (-1.63) 
RET t 0.008 (1.41)  0.022 (1.50)  0.023 (1.59) 
NEG t × RET t 0.293*** (18.45)  0.419*** (13.46)  0.415*** (13.38) 
POST -0.001 (-0.10)  -0.000 (-0.08)  0.001 (0.24) 
POST × NEG t -0.008 (-0.73)  -0.009 (-0.90)  -0.010 (-0.96) 
POST × RET t -0.003 (-0.60)  -0.002 (-0.45)  -0.009* (-1.95) 
POST × NEG t × RET t -0.104*** (-4.32)  -0.093*** (-4.32)  -0.086*** (-3.76) 
MTB t-1    -0.001 (-0.08)  0.001 (0.13) 
MTB t-1 × NEG t    -0.001 (-0.10)  -0.002 (-0.10) 
MTB t-1 × RET t    -0.034** (-2.47)  -0.033** (-2.35) 
MTB t-1 × NEG t × RET t    -0.214*** (-6.32)  -0.225*** (-6.96) 
LEV t-1    0.005 (0.74)  -0.001 (-0.11) 
LEV t-1 × NEG t    0.008 (0.93)  0.007 (0.77) 
LEV t-1 × RET t    0.013 (1.04)  0.014 (1.09) 
LEV t-1 × NEG t × RET t    0.078*** (2.78)  0.085*** (3.06) 
SIZE t-1    0.031*** (3.37)  0.026*** (2.90) 
SIZE t-1 × NEG t    0.023** (2.41)  0.025** (2.49) 
SIZE t-1 × RET t    0.011 (0.92)  0.019 (1.57) 
SIZE t-1 × NEG t × RET t    -0.142*** (-3.89)  -0.147*** (-3.92) 
LITIG t-1    -0.054*** (-4.95)  -0.046*** (-4.86) 
LITIG t-1 × NEG t    0.019 (1.51)  0.020* (1.68) 
LITIG t-1 × RET t    0.005 (0.34)  0.001 (0.04) 
LITIG t-1 × NEG t × RET t    -0.010 (-0.30)  0.004 (0.12) 
Constant 0.047*** (18.80)  0.034*** (4.24)  0.013 (1.53) 
# of Observations 17,924   17,924   17,924  
Adj. R2 0.111   0.153   0.165  
State and Year FE No   No   Yes  
 
Note: This table presents the results of the change in conservatism based on Equation (2). The sample 
period is from 1993 to 1998. See Table A2 for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Analysis Conditional on Branching Restrictions Enacted by States 
Panel A: Branching Restrictiveness by State 
State 
Branching 
Restrictiveness 
Index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) State 
Branching 
Restrictiveness 
Index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
AK 2 1 1 0 0 MT 4 1 1 1 1 
AL 3 1 1 1 0 NC 0 0 0 0 0 
AR 4 1 1 1 1 ND 3 0 1 1 1 
AZ 3 1 1 1 0 NE 4 1 1 1 1 
CA 3 1 1 1 0 NH 4 1 1 1 1 
CO 4 1 1 1 1 NJ 1 0 1 0 0 
CT 1 1 0 0 0 NM 3 1 1 1 0 
DC 0 0 0 0 0 NV 3 1 1 1 0 
DE 3 1 1 1 0 NY 2 1 1 0 0 
FL 3 1 1 1 0 OH 0 0 0 0 0 
GA 3 1 1 1 0 OK 4 1 1 1 1 
HI 3 1 1 1 0 OR 3 1 1 1 0 
IA 4 1 1 1 1 PA 0 0 0 0 0 
ID 3 1 1 1 0 RI 0 0 0 0 0 
IL 3 1 1 1 0 SC 3 1 1 1 0 
IN 0 0 0 0 0 SD 3 1 1 1 0 
KS 4 1 1 1 1 TN 3 1 1 1 0 
KY 4 1 1 1 1 TX 4 1 1 1 1 
LA 3 1 1 1 0 UT 2 1 1 0 0 
MA 1 1 0 0 0 VA 0 0 0 0 0 
MD 0 0 0 0 0 VT 2 1 1 0 0 
ME 0 0 0 0 0 WA 3 1 1 1 0 
MI 0 0 0 0 0 WI 3 1 1 1 0 
MN 3 1 1 1 0 WV 1 0 0 0 1 
MO 4 1 1 1 1 WY 3 1 1 1 0 
MS 4 1 1 1 1       
 
 
Panel B: Summary of Branching Restrictiveness Index 
 
Index=0 Index=1 Index=2 Index=3 Index=4 
Enacted 
both (3) 
and (4) 
Enacted 
(3) or (4) 
but not 
both 
Enacted 
neither 
(3) or 
(4) 
Number 
of States 
10 4 4 21 12 13 20 18 
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Table 4. – Continued  
Panel C: Analysis Conditional on Branching Restrictiveness 
Dependent Variable: NIt      
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Coefficient t-
value 
 Coefficient t-
value 
 Coefficient t-
value 
NEG t -0.002 (-0.59)  -0.017* (-1.79)  -0.018* (-1.82) 
RET t 0.006 (1.22)  0.020 (1.45)  0.021 (1.51) 
NEG t × RET t 0.271*** (19.46)  0.407*** (13.41)  0.406*** (13.90) 
INDEX -0.001 (-0.33)  -0.001 (-0.42)  -0.001 (-0.58) 
INDEX × NEG t -0.000 (-0.13)  -0.001 (-0.21)  -0.000 (-0.11) 
INDEX × RET t 0.000 (0.19)  0.001 (0.29)  -0.001 (-0.85) 
INDEX × NEG t × RET t -0.027*** (-3.69)  -0.025*** (-3.80)  -0.024*** (-3.77) 
Constant 0.047*** (17.78)  0.034*** (4.30)  0.014 (1.51) 
# of Observations 17,924   17,924   17,924  
Adj. R2 0.109   0.152   0.164  
Controls No   Yes   Yes  
State and Year FE No   No   Yes  
 
Note: This table presents the results of the change in conservatism based on Equation (2), conditional on 
restrictions enacted by states. Panel A replicates Table 1 of Rice and Strahan (2010) that reports the 
branching restrictiveness in each state after the IBBEA was passed. The Branching Restrictiveness Index is 
added one if states enacted one of the four restrictions denoted in Footnote 4. Panel B reports the summary 
of the Branching Restrictiveness Index. Panel C reports the regression results conditional on interstate 
restrictions. The sample period is from 1993 to 1998. Control variables MTB, LEV, SIZE and LITIG and 
their interactions with NEG and RET are included. See Table A2 for variable definitions. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. – Continued  
Panel D: Analysis Conditional on Different Enactment of Restrictions 
Dependent Variable: NI t      
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-
value 
 Coefficient t-value 
NEG t -0.023 (-0.97)  -0.001 (-0.03)  -0.027* (-1.70) 
RET t 0.041** (2.00)  0.016 (1.24)  0.022* (1.78) 
NEG t × RET t 0.355*** (5.50)  0.501*** (11.20)  0.359*** (8.25) 
POST 0.005 (0.44)  0.006 (0.68)  -0.010 (-1.24) 
POST × NEG t -0.014 (-1.01)  -0.012 (-1.09)  -0.003 (-0.27) 
POST × RET t -0.028** (-2.13)  -0.014 (-1.37)  0.004 (0.39) 
POST × NEG t × RET t 0.008 (0.22)  -0.112*** (-4.22)  -0.105*** (-4.09) 
Constant 0.079* (1.89)  0.079** (2.48)  0.013 (0.27) 
# of Observations 3,370   7,153   7,401  
Adj. R2 0.179   0.179   0.147  
Controls Yes   Yes   Yes  
State and Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes  
Chi-Square (1) & (2) 6.22 
0.01 
   
p-value    
Chi-Square (2) & (3)    0.04 
p-value    0.84 
Chi-Square (1) & (3) 4.35 
0.04 p-value 
  
Note: Panel D of Table 4 presents the results of the change in conservatism based on Equation (2), 
conditional on the restrictiveness of different provisions. Column (1) reports the regression results based on 
observations in the states that enact both Restrictions (3) and (4). Column (2) reports the regression results 
based on observations in the states that enact either Restriction (3) or (4) but not both. Column (3) reports 
the regression results based on observations in the states that enact neither Restrictions (3) nor (4). The 
sample period is from 1993 to 1998. Control variables MTB, LEV, SIZE and LITIG and their interactions 
with NEG and RET are included. See Table A2 for variable definitions. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Analysis Conditional on Operation Concentration 
    
Dependent Variable: NIt    
 (1)  (2) 
 Bottom Tercile  Top Tercile 
 Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value 
NEG t -0.048 (-1.54)  -0.001 (-0.03) 
RET t -0.009 (-0.26)  0.041* (1.73) 
NEG t × RET t 0.250** (2.48)  0.437*** (6.58) 
POST 0.017 (1.29)  0.006 (0.75) 
POST × NEG t -0.025 (-0.76)  -0.008 (-0.49) 
POST × RET t -0.001 (-0.03)  -0.003 (-0.25) 
POST × NEG t × RET t -0.043 (-0.77)  -0.146*** (-4.55) 
Constant 0.069*** (4.03)  -4.199*** (-69.56) 
# of Observations 3,693   3,703  
Adj. R2 0.136   0.163  
Controls Yes   Yes  
State and Year FE Yes   Yes  
Chi-Square 2.99 
p-value 0.08 
 
Note: This table presents the results of the change in conservatism based on of Equation (2), conditional on 
the percentage of a firm’s operations in the headquarter state (Garcia and Norli 2012) in the year prior to 
the IBBEA. The sample period is from 1993 to 1998. Control variables MTB, LEV, SIZE and LITIG and 
their interactions with NEG and RET are included. See Table A2 for variable definitions. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 8. Robustness Tests 
 
Panel A: Dynamic Effects of the IBBEA 
Dependent Variable: NIt   
 [-3, 3] 
 Coefficient t-value 
IBBEA (-3) × NEG t × RET t -0.035 (-0.54) 
IBBEA (-2) × NEG t × RET t -0.030 (-0.61) 
IBBEA (-1) × NEG t × RET t -0.012 (-0.24) 
IBBEA (0) × NEG t × RET t 0.035 (0.66) 
IBBEA (1) × NEG t × RET t -0.119** (-2.42) 
IBBEA (2) × NEG t × RET t -0.084* (-1.94) 
IBBEA (3) × NEG t × RET t -0.025 (-0.52) 
   
Constant 0.024** (2.52) 
# of Observations 17,924  
Adj. R2 0.167  
Controls Yes  
State and Year FE Yes  
 
 
Panel B: Placebo Tests 
Dependent Variable: NIt      
 (1)   (2)   (3) 
 Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-
value 
 Coefficient t-value 
NEG t -0.019 (-1.40)  -0.015 (-1.12)  -0.016 (-1.64) 
RET t 0.027 (1.34)  0.035** (2.11)  0.028* (1.99) 
NEG t × RET t 0.424*** (11.05)  0.402*** (11.02)  0.400*** (11.96) 
POST 0.002 (0.37)  0.009* (1.88)  -0.001 (-0.11) 
POST × NEG t -0.006 (-0.52)  -0.017** (-2.33)  -0.010 (-1.14) 
POST × RET t -0.003 (-0.35)  -0.008 (-1.09)  -0.007 (-1.14) 
POST × NEG t × RET t -0.056 (-1.25)  -0.035 (-1.26)  -0.035 (-1.63) 
Constant 0.011 (1.12)  0.006 (0.58)  0.011 (1.37) 
# of Observations 17,924   17,924   17,924  
Adj. R2 0.162   0.163   0.162  
Controls Yes   Yes   Yes  
State and Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes  
 
Note: Panel A of Table 8 presents the results on the dynamic effects of the IBBEA on conditional 
conservatism based on of Equation (2) during the sample period. Panel B of Table 8 presents the results on 
the change in conservatism based on Equation (2), if the effective date of IBBEA was N years earlier than 
the actual effective date, N=4, 3, and 2 in columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. The sample period is from 
1993 to 1998. Control variables MTB, LEV, SIZE and LITIG and their interactions with NEG and RET are 
included. See Table A2 for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. – continued 
Panel C: Historical Headquartered States 
Dependent Variable: NIt      
 (1)   (2)   (3) 
 Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-
value 
 Coefficient t-value 
NEG t 0.001 (0.38)  -0.015 (-1.63)  -0.015 (-1.58) 
RET t 0.008 (1.38)  0.022 (1.51)  0.023 (1.60) 
NEG t × RET t 0.299*** (18.15)  0.430*** (13.83)  0.422*** (13.90) 
POST -0.001 (-0.12)  -0.001 (-0.10)  0.001 (0.23) 
POST × NEG t -0.008 (-0.76)  -0.010 (-0.92)  -0.011 (-0.97) 
POST × RET t -0.003 (-0.59)  -0.002 (-0.35)  -0.009* (-1.72) 
POST × NEG t × RET t -0.112*** (-4.42)  -0.097*** (-4.37)  -0.089*** (-3.78) 
Constant 0.047*** (19.18)  0.033*** (4.23)  0.013 (1.53) 
# of Observations 17,909   17,909   17,909  
Adj. R2 0.112   0.155   0.167  
Controls No   Yes   Yes  
State and Year FE No   No   Yes  
 
Note: Panel C of Table 8 presents the results on the change in conservatism based on Equation (2), using 
historical headquartered states from 10-Ks. The sample period is from 1993 to 1998. Control variables 
MTB, LEV, SIZE and LITIG and their interactions with NEG and RET are included. See Table A2 for 
variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are clustered 
at the state level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9. Measurement Issues for Conditional Conservatism 
Panel A: Decompose Earnings    
 (1)  (2) 
 Dependent Variable=ACC t  Dependent Variable=CFO t 
 Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value 
NEG t -0.018 (-1.05)  0.003 (0.21) 
RET t -0.033* (-1.96)  0.056*** (2.86) 
NEG t × RET t 0.229*** (5.88)  0.187*** (4.77) 
POST 0.002 (0.20)  -0.000 (-0.02) 
POST × NEG t -0.001 (-0.19)  -0.008 (-1.05) 
POST × RET t 0.010 (0.73)  -0.021 (-1.41) 
POST × NEG t × RET t -0.075** (-2.39)  -0.011 (-0.44) 
Constant -0.242*** (-28.38)  0.255*** (26.27) 
# of Observations 17,865   17,865  
Adj. R2 0.093   0.130  
Controls Yes   Yes  
State and Year FE Yes   Yes  
 
 
Panel B: Alternative Measure of Conditional Conservatism 
Dependent Variable: C-Score t 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value 
POST -0.035*** (-9.70)  -0.035*** (-9.61)  -0.039*** (-8.76) 
LITIG t-1    -0.008*** (-6.21)  -0.007*** (-6.21) 
Constant 0.040*** (65.44)  0.042*** (60.92)  0.036*** (11.86) 
# of Observations 16,527   16,527   16,527  
Adj. R2 0.255   0.258   0.286  
State FE No   No   Yes  
 
 
Panel C: Alternative Measure of Conditional Conservatism, Independent Variable=INDEX 
Dependent Variable: C-Score t 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value 
INDEX -0.009*** (-6.36)  -0.009*** (-6.42)  -0.000* (-1.91) 
LITIG t-1    -0.009*** (-7.94)  -0.003*** (-3.91) 
Constant 0.036*** (51.42)  0.038*** (62.45)  0.039*** (49.22) 
# of Observations 16,527   16,527   16,527  
Adj. R2 0.165   0.169   0.640  
State and Year FE No   No   Yes  
 
Note: Panel A of Table 9 presents the results of the change in conservatism based on Equation (2), using 
accruals and cash flow components of earnings as dependent variables. Panel B and Panel C of Table 9 
present the results of the change in conservatism based on Equation (2), using C-Score as the dependent 
variable. The sample period is from 1993 to 1998. Control variables MTB, LEV, SIZE and LITIG and their 
interactions with NEG and RET are included in Panel A. See Table A2 for variable definitions. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
